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Abstract 
When the policy choice in one jurisdiction depends on those of other jurisdictions, then poli-
cies are said to be spatially dependent. In this article, we discuss how scholars can bring theo-
ries of spatial policy dependence and empirical model specifications closer in line so that the 
empirical analysis actually tests the theoretical predictions. Specifically, comprehensive theo-
ries of spatial policy dependence will typically suggest that the jurisdictions receiving spatial 
stimuli systematically differ in their exposure to such signals as a function of the intensity of 
their interaction with other jurisdictions. Similarly, theories will often predict that govern-
ments also differ in their responsiveness to any given spatial stimulus as a function of the in-
stitutional, political, economic or social context in which they operate. In other words, theo-
ries typically postulate that spatial dependence is conditional on exposure and responsiveness, 
neither of which is accounted for in the standard empirical practice of estimating one single 
common coefficient for a row-standardized spatial lag variable. We show how scholars can 




Most policies are spatially dependent. The policy choice of one country, region, state or mu-
nicipality depends partly on previous policy choices of other countries, regions, states or mu-
nicipalities. Yet, though political scientists had discussed spatial policy dependence since at 
least the early 1970s from a theoretical perspective,1 it required advances in spatial economet-
rics and methodological advice (Anselin 1988, 2002, Beck, Gleditsch and Beardsley 2006; 
Franzese and Hays 2007a, 2008) to turn the study of spatial policy dependence into one of the 
fastest growing fields in comparative politics and international relations. Political scientists 
have developed theories identifying externalities, learning, and coercion as main causal 
mechanisms for spatial policy dependence (Jahn, 2006, Swank, 2006, Gilardi et al. 2009). 
They have also recently started exploring heterogeneity in exposure and responsiveness to 
spatial effects (Basinger and Hallerberg 2004, Swank 2006, Shipan and Volden 2008). 
However, much existing empirical literature seeks to provide evidence for the mere existence 
of spatial policy dependence, rather than on the causal mechanisms through which policy 
choices become spatially dependent on previous choices of the same policy in other 
jurisdictions (Boehmke and Witmer 2004: 39). Similarly, almost no empirical studies 
explicitly test for heterogeneity among recipients of spatial effects. There thus remains a 
considerable gap between the predictions derived from theories of spatial policy dependence 
and the hypotheses de facto tested in empirical research. 
                                                 
1
  Early works include Cooper’s The Economics of Interdependence (Cooper 1968), Vernon's 
Sovereignty at Bay (Vernon 1971) and Keohane and Nye’s Power and Interdependence 
(Keohane and Nye 1977). See Graham, Shipan and Volden (2008) for a review of recent 
theoretical advances and Gilardi (2010) for a discussion of learning theories.  
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This article seeks to close this gap. Starting from the observation that theories of spatial pol-
icy dependence and the empirical models political scientists employ to test these theories are 
often not well connected, we argue that most theories of spatial policy dependence either are 
already inherently conditional or, if not, should be, while empirical models with few 
exceptions estimate an unconditional spatial effect. We show that empirical tests of spatial 
policy dependence require more attention to two kinds of causal heterogeneity. First, in fol-
lowing the common practice of row-standardizing the connectivity or weighting matrix, 
scholars implicitly assume that the aggregate spatial stimulus is the same for all receiving 
countries. In contrast, theories of spatial policy dependence usually predict that the strength 
of this stimulus systematically differs across receiving jurisdictions. For example, theories of 
spatial policy dependence which rely on learning as the principal causal mechanism often 
contend that the policy-makers learn more if they have more and more intensive social inter-
actions with other policy-makers in international organizations and other venues (Sikkink 
1993, Ramirez et al. 1997). Likewise, externalities tend to increase with the level of total in-
teraction with the outside world (Garrett 1995, 2000).  
Second, with few exceptions, empirical analyses assume that the strength of the spatial ef-
fects is independent of the responsiveness of the jurisdiction receiving the stimulus. In con-
trast, theory suggests that the responsiveness of governments to a given spatial stimulus sys-
tematically varies with the political context and economic and social circumstances. For ex-
ample, Gilardi (2005: 92) states that “[T]he impact of liberalization (…) is conditional on the 
characteristics of the political system, notably the extent to which policy change is difficult”, 
while Basinger and Hallerberg (2004: 275) argue that “a country’s own political situation, 
combined with the institutional makeup of potential competitors, affects a country’s decisions 
regarding competing for capital.” Mosley and Uno (2007: 941) highlight “exploring further 
(…) the interaction between the internal (domestic) and external drivers” as a top priority for 
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research on spatial dependence in labor rights. These theories thus predict that political sys-
tems and other domestic factors exert an influence on the spatial effect itself. 
This paper contributes to the rapidly growing literature on the analysis of spatial policy de-
pendence by offering theoretical and model specification advice.2 As Graham, Shipan and 
Volden (2008: 31) have put it, while “scholars have found sparks of insights about the condi-
tional nature of policy diffusion”, they have “yet to illuminate a systematic path forward.” By 
identifying two causes for conditional spatial policy dependence – exposure and responsive-
ness – and by developing empirical models for testing these theories, we try to push the liter-
ature forward in the direction in which Graham et al. (2008: 30) locate the “future of policy 
diffusion” research. Like these authors, we contend that comprehensive theories of spatial 
policy dependence must go beyond explaining why policies are spatially dependent. Instead, 
they must identify the causal mechanisms of spatial policy dependence, they have to consider 
whether and how the strength of the aggregate spatial stimulus varies across receiving juris-
dictions, and they have to explain why governments of different jurisdictions respond differ-
ently to any given spatial stimulus. 
                                                 
2
  Spatial policy dependence, as we use the term, is conceptually close, but not identical to 
policy diffusion and interdependence. Interdependence is the most general term, describing a 
situation in which policy choices or outcomes in one country affect the same or other policies 
or outcomes in other countries. Diffusion is the most restrictive term, referring to situations in 
which policy choices in one jurisdiction affect the choice of the same policies in other 
jurisdictions in the same direction. In contrast, spatial policy dependence describes situations 
in which the choice of a specific policy in one jurisdiction influences the choice of the same 
policy in other countries, but not necessarily in the same direction. Distinguishing these terms 
is more than an exercise in semantics, it has repercussions on empirical model specification 
for analyzing these processes. Interdependence that is not also spatial policy dependence 
cannot be adequately modeled by what is known as a spatial lag model, in which the 
dependent variable is regressed on the weighted values of the dependent variables in other 
units of observation. Instead, it needs to be modeled by what is known as a spatial-x model 
(Plümper and Neumayer 2010a).  
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We also contribute to the methodological state-of-the-art in spatial econometric model speci-
fication. We show that the standard specification suggested by methodologists and used by 
applied researchers does not fit comprehensive theories of spatial policy dependence. This 
holds especially for the conditionalities that theorists claim to exist but researchers implicitly 
assume away by row-standardizing the spatial lag variable and by failing to explicitly model 
the influence of contextual factors on governments’ responsiveness to spatial policy influ-
ences. We demonstrate how researchers can stick to the common practice of row-standardiz-
ing the weighting matrix and yet capture differences in exposure to the spatial stimulus 
experienced by jurisdictions as well as differences in the responsiveness of jurisdictions to 
any given spatial stimulus. Both types of conditional spatial policy dependence are best 
modeled as interaction effects, even if the underlying reason for heterogeneity is different. 
2. The Logic of Spatial Policy Dependence and the Case for Conditionality 
Theories of spatial policy dependence typically predict that whilst many policies are spatially 
dependent, this dependence is unlikely to be uniform across jurisdictions. This section 
advances this generally accepted theoretical idea by arguing that spatial policy dependence is 
conditioned by two factors: exposure to the influence of other jurisdictions and responsive-
ness to any given spatial stimulus. We develop our argument referring to three genuine causal 
mechanisms for spatial policy dependence: externalities, which are conceptually 
indistinguishable from competition; learning, which is typically indistinguishable from 
emulation (Meseguer 2005); and coercion.3 In what follows, we discuss these three main 
                                                 
3
  Causal mechanisms of spatial policy dependence are of course not mutually exclusive. 
Instead, they can reinforce each other, rendering it empirically difficult to empirically 
disentangle their effects. Note also that others have identified as few as two (Boehmke and 
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causal mechanisms of spatial policy dependence, providing arguments for the existence of 
heterogeneity in exposure and responsiveness in each one of them.  
2.1. Exposure and Responsiveness to Externalities 
Externalities describe a situation in which the policy choices of other jurisdictions k create a 
cost (negative externality) or benefit (positive externality) to jurisdiction i. If the strength of 
the externality is sufficiently strong, jurisdiction i may wish to offset or magnify by also 
changing its policy. Externalities can be distinguished according to whether they are direct or 
indirect, with indirect externalities that exert an influence via third parties often called 
competition. Theories of direct externalities require some form of cross-border movement 
between the sender of the spatial stimulus and its receiver, for example, the cross-border 
exchange of capital, goods, services, persons, or pollutants, which carries the externality from 
the sender to the receiver. Yet, externalities do not need to be direct. Assume, for example, 
that two countries have industries which produce and export similar products, but these two 
countries do not trade with each other. This constellation does not prevent externalities 
because both countries could compete on third markets with each other.  
Whether direct or indirect, theories of externalities will also make straightforward predictions 
on exposure: jurisdictions that, in total, exchange more goods and services (relative to their 
size), more capital, more people, more pollutants than others are more exposed to externali-
ties than these other jurisdictions, which have less of such exchange. Thus, for example, if 
direct externalities are carried over to other countries by, say, trade, then two countries which 
have the same set of major trading partners will experience different exposure to externalities 
                                                                                                                                                        
Witmer 2004: 40) and as many as six (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Dobbin at al. 2007) causal 
mechanisms.  
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if one country is very open toward trade in terms of either a larger volume of trade or a higher 
level of trade openness (trade relative to economic size), while the other one is more closed. 
In fact, it is very difficult to conceive of an externality-based theory of spatial policy depend-
ence that would not also predict that exposure varies across jurisdictions. 
Likewise, governments’ responsiveness to externalities caused by other jurisdictions is very 
likely to vary even if jurisdictions have similar levels of exposure. Fundamentally, our argu-
ment is that the very same institutional, political, economic and social conditions which drive 
differences in policies across jurisdictions should also drive differences in the responsiveness 
to a spatial stimulus from the outside. First, a government’s response depends on whether 
externalities affect actors that exert an influence on the survival of the government. Constitu-
tional rules exert a large influence on governments’ responsiveness by determining the piv-
otal actor on which the support for and eventually the survival of the government depends 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, Persson and Tabellini 2003, Plümper and Martin 2003), by 
defining the limits of political autonomy, and by delimiting the opposition’s influence on 
policy choices. The most obvious constitutional influence results from the importance of 
elections on the survival of the government. If elections do not exist or if they have no influ-
ence on government survival and externalities do not affect the ruling elite, the autocratic 
governments’ responsiveness to policies in other countries remains limited. In democracies, 
externalities are likely to affect voters and interest groups, but responsiveness may still de-
pend on a government’s accountability, the political strength of the government, political in-
stitutions that may reduce the political autonomy of the government, on partisan preferences, 
the existence and position of veto players, the influence of lobby groups and so on (Golder 
2005, Boix 1999; Grossman and Helpman 2001; Cao and Prakash 2009). For example, left-
leaning governments may be less responsive to the spatial stimulus induced by international 
tax competition as they are, all other things equal, averse to lower corporate tax rates, which 
8 
might well have to be accompanied by either lower public spending or higher labor tax rates. 
As another example, more unitary governments may find it easier to respond to international 
tax competition than more fractionalized governments, in which many players with diverging 
interests and positions can exert an influence on government policy (Laver and Shepsle 
1990). In societies, in which the social norm of fairness and equality is more deeply 
entrenched than others, governments might find it more difficult to respond to spatial stimuli 
pushing in the direction of more free-market policies. 
2.2. Exposure and Responsiveness to Learning 
Learning theories of spatial dependence presuppose that governments do not know the opti-
mal policy. Governments can observe the effect of policies in other jurisdictions and profit 
from their good or bad experiences (Bennett 1991: 221; Dolowitz and Marsh 1996). As a 
consequence, learning can lead to policy diffusion if jurisdictions learn from positive exam-
ples and under certain circumstances learning will lead to convergence, but it can also create 
divergence if policies diffuse first among a minority of jurisdictions that previously held a 
different policy implemented by the majority of jurisdictions. Divergence may also result if 
jurisdictions learn from negative examples (Zimring and Hawkins 1986: 38-45, Epstein and 
Kobylka 1992).4  
Most proponents of learning theories assume that learning depends on direct interaction and 
communication between policy-makers, policy advisers5 or other relevant stakeholders with 
influence on policies (Rogers 1995: ch. 1). For many scholars, learning is a mere function of 
                                                 
4
  Interestingly, the social sciences have no term for the spatial process in which a policy change 
in one jurisdiction provides an incentive for others to shift policies in the opposite direction. 
We thus prefer the more general term spatial policy dependence, which can account for both 
policy diffusion and the opposite effect, call it policy repulsion (for lack of a better term).  
5
  See, inter alia, Haas (1992), Dobbin et al. (2007), King (2005) and Weishaupt (2010).  
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interaction and communication rather than a deliberative process consisting of collecting and 
evaluating information and making inferences from other jurisdictions’ experiences to their 
own (Gilardi 2010, Boehmke 2009, Meseguer 2005). Learning as a side-effect of interaction 
and communication, call it diffuse learning, tempted researchers to use joint membership in 
committees and international organizations as a proxy for the degree to which actors learn 
from each other or perhaps emulate each other’s behavior (Haas 1992, Kemmerling 2010, 
Needergard 2009, Jahn 2006).  
Even for such diffuse learning or for mere emulation, it is likely that the learning process 
depends on exposure in the form of the density of interactions with important senders. There-
fore, diffuse learning becomes more likely as the frequency and the intensity of contacts in-
crease. Whatever contact scholars have in mind – be it diplomatic relations, joint membership 
in international organizations, informal fora for negotiations and discussions, or the same set 
of interest groups – different governments will have different levels of exposure to learning 
environments depending on the extent to which they have contact with policy makers from 
other jurisdictions (Hafner-Burton et al. 2008). 
The case for heterogeneous exposure to learning becomes even clearer when we consider in-
tentional learning. This form of deliberate learning occurs when government representatives 
seek to solve a problem, i.e. improve the outcomes in a certain area by trying to find a suita-
ble policy reform (Baturo and Gray 2009, Lee and Strang 2006). In these situations, govern-
ments actively seek to identify similar jurisdictions with a different policy that achieved bet-
ter (or worse) results. The extent to which governments can learn from the policy outcomes in 
other jurisdictions depends on the frequency and the intensity of direct interactions with these 
other jurisdictions as learning presupposes that policy makers understand which policy 
choices led to the better or worse outcomes from those who had enacted them. 
10 
Whether diffuse or intentional learning is considered, governments also differ in their respon-
siveness to outside learning stimuli in the form of differences in the capacity to learn from 
others as well as in the constraints they face for changing policies in the direction of what has 
been learned. Heterogeneity in capacity to learn may be modeled by the level of human capi-
tal and the quality of the administrative infrastructure at the disposal of policy-makers wish-
ing to learn. Heterogeneity in the constraints imposed on governmental leeway to change 
policies will often resemble the manifold reasons for heterogeneous responsiveness we have 
listed above for externalities as the causal mechanism of spatial policy dependence. Thus, for 
example, jurisdictions in which fundamental policy changes require constitutional change or 
super-majorities will find changing policies toward other jurisdictions’ role model examples 
more difficult. Jurisdictions with fractionalized governments may respond less to learning, 
not least because different parts of the governing coalition may take home different, and 
sometimes contradictory, lessons from the learning experience. Responsiveness to learning 
can also be a function of the state of the economy and the stability of the political system. 
Crises can increase the willingness of governments to take risks and engage in policy experi-
ments (Drazen and Grilli 1993; Rodrik 1996). If a government believes it will lose the next 
election unless an economic miracle happens, it becomes more willing to try policies, which 
were seemingly successful elsewhere, even if their voters and influential lobby groups dislike 
them. 
Variation in the degree to which political actors learn from the policy experience in other ju-
risdictions can also result from processes, for which the line between heterogeneity in expo-
sure and heterogeneity in responsiveness is blurred. The extent to which new information 
changes the behavior of political actors depends on their priors and the extent to which politi-
cal actors allow themselves to be exposed to new information that contradicts these priors. 
Even the most compelling evidence is typically met with reservation by those who hold views 
11 
that largely deviate from this new evidence (Gilardi 2010). Under many circumstances, the 
probability of policy changes given new information thus depends on the distance between 
the actor’s established beliefs and the new information received. In these cases, spatial de-
pendence becomes inherently conditional because – depending on their prior believes and the 
nature of the new information – policy-makers and governments have different propensities 
to learn from and to respond to new information and evidence. Their response will systemati-
cally vary with the degree to which new evidence supports their prior beliefs and policy in-
tentions. What makes this hard to categorize as either heterogeneity in exposure or in respon-
siveness is that governments who do not wish to respond to inconvenient new information 
will select to expose themselves less to venues in which such information is disseminated. 
For example, countries have the option to choose the policy of empty chairs and stay away 
from international conferences, in which case they choose not to be exposed to potentially 
new information. Alternatively, governments can attend the conference, but refuse to update 
their priors despite potential new information.6 
2.3. Exposure and Responsiveness to Coercion 
Coercion causes spatial policy dependence if and only if other actors directly or indirectly 
(via other actors) exert pressure on a government to change a policy to bring it in line with 
their own policy.7 Coercion can be exercised “by governments, international organizations, 
                                                 
6
  The avoidance of learning is difficult if not impossible for individuals. However, govern-
ments can send delegates to conferences and then ignore any new information they might 
bring home.  
7
  It is important to clearly distinguish the motive for coercion from its means. Governments do 
not coerce other governments simply because they can, but because they have an ideological, 
political, economic, social, or cultural incentive to do so. Since coercion is not only costly to 
12 
and nongovernmental actors through physical force, the manipulation of economic costs and 
benefits, and even the monopolization of information or expertise.” (Dobbin et al. 2007: 
454)8  
The probability of using coercive means will vary across potential senders, while the proba-
bility of “giving in” will vary across receivers. Even if senders are willing and in principle 
able to coerce, they may not be fully successful across the range of receivers of coercion. One 
reason is that receivers differ in the extent they are exposed to the actual pressure from co-
ercer, which is a function of receiver’s power to withstand coercive attempts. Another reason 
for differences in the probability of succumbing to coercion stems from differences in re-
sponsiveness to pressure of any given strength. Governments are more likely to react to out-
side pressure if they find themselves in a serious economic or political crisis, which renders 
maintaining the status quo extremely costly. The same governments that will dismiss condi-
                                                                                                                                                        
the receiver of political pressure but also to the sender, governments may be reluctant to 
coerce other governments if the cost of coercion is higher than the potential gain from the 
other government giving in. In turn, even if governments have an incentive to coerce other 
governments, they may simply lack the means of doing so. 
8
  In many cases, coercion is a response to externalities. For example, in the second half of the 
1980s, the US exerted pressure on Japan’s monetary and fiscal policies because the US 
government did not want to adjust its own monetary and fiscal policies in a way that reduces 
the effect of Japan’s policies on the US labor market (McKinnon and Ohno 1997). A special 
case of coercive spatial policy dependence emanates from conditional membership in 
international organizations. Membership in the EU, for example, depends on prior 
implementation of the acquis communautaire (Mattli and Plümper 2004, Plümper and 
Schneider 2007). As a consequence, policies of applicant countries spatially depend on prior 
EU decisions and indirectly on policies other EU members have already in place. 
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tions on their fiscal and monetary policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) or the Euro-zone countries as unwarranted interference in their sovereign decision-
making when economic times are good, will readily accept such conditions if they find them-
selves in deep economic crisis. 
3. Exposure and Responsiveness in Empirical Research on Spatial Policy 
Dependence 
Before the rise of spatial econometric methods in comparative politics, empirical analyses 
modeled spatial policy dependence as a function of a jurisdiction’s total interaction with oth-
ers in the form of total trade openness (e.g., Garrett 1995; Rodrik 1997), the presence or ab-
sence of capital controls (e.g., Garrett 1995; Quinn 1997), the number of international meet-
ings attended (Haas and Schmitter 1964) and so on. Such specifications failed to take into 
account that spatial policy dependence presupposes different policies in different countries 
and that policy makers react to these different foreign policies or changes in these policies. 
For example, foreign pressure on effective capital tax rates does not only depend on capital 
mobility, but also on the effective capital tax rates in other countries. If all countries em-
ployed the same tax policies, the absence of capital controls would not lead to tax competi-
tion.  
While the move to spatial econometric models meant explicitly taking differences in policies 
across jurisdictions into account, a fundamental insight of these earlier studies was lost along 
the way, namely that a jurisdictions’s total level of interaction with the outside world matters 
as well – as argued above, it determines heterogeneity in exposure to the spatial stimulus. 
This insight was lost because methodologists advise applied scholars to row-standardize the 
connectivity matrix, a habit regarded as ‘commonly’ (Franzese and Hays 2006: 174, 2008: 
29), ‘generally’ (Darmofal 2006: 8), ‘typically’ (Anselin 2002: 257) or ‘usually’ (Beck et al. 
14 
2006: 28) followed.9 Row-standardization – for each row of the matrix each cell is divided by 
its row sum, resulting in a new row-standardized weighting matrix in which the weights in 
each row now must add up to one – takes out all level effects from the weighting matrix. The 
row-standardized connectivity or weighting matrix merely measures the relative importance 
of other jurisdictions k to the jurisdiction i under observation and the resulting spatial lag 
variable represents a weighted average of policies in other jurisdictions k. Consider, for 
example, the simple case of contiguity between countries. If scholars row-standardize, 
countries receive the same spatial stimulus regardless of whether they have one neighbor 
such as Portugal or nine neighbors such as Germany if the average value of the dependent 
variable in the countries around Germany is the same as the value of the dependent variable 
in Spain – Portugal’s only neighbor. In other words, with row-standardization, exposure 
varies only if the average value of the dependent variable in the connected countries varies, 
without row-standardization, exposure also varies in the number of connections.10 
Row-standardization has never been theoretically justified. It has always simply been a habit 
imposed by econometric convenience. Because row-standardization ensures that the spatial 
lag will have “the same potential metric or units” as the dependent variable itself (Ward and 
Gleditsch 2008: 80), it allows an easy interpretation of the coefficient size of the spatial lag 
                                                 
9
  Whether this advice has actually been followed is hard to say. A survey of studies employing 
spatial effects in political science research revealed that few scholars explicitly state that they 
row-standardize their weighting matrix (Plümper and Neumayer 2010a), rendering it difficult 
to assess whether they actually row-standardize and fail to say so or do something else. 
10
  With a non-binary connectivity variable, exposure also varies with the level of connectivity, 
not just the number of connections. 
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variable and an easy comparison with the coefficient of the temporal lag (Franzese and Hays 
2008: 55).  
If row-standardization is a matter of convenience rather than necessity, why not simply aban-
don it? In Plümper and Neumayer (2010a) we have in fact argued that scholars should con-
sider using weighting matrices that are not row-standardized to allow for differences in the 
exposure to the spatial stimulus unless theory clearly predicts that the spatial stimulus is equal 
across jurisdictions. Yet, in the next section we will show that this turns out to be a special 
case of an interaction effect model, in which the row-standardized spatial lag variable is 
interacted with the variable capturing differences in exposure, thus representing a superior 
modeling strategy. Yet, we know of only one existing study that explicitly accounts for 
heterogeneity in exposure in this way. Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) show that countries 
with higher domestic capital controls are less exposed to the spatial effect from competitor 
countries’ changes in tax rates than countries with lower or no capital controls, while 
Wasserfallen (2011) demonstrates that cantons with a more favorable geo-strategic location 
are less exposed to tax competition among Swiss cantons. 
What about heterogeneity in responsiveness to a given spatial stimulus, the other form of 
conditional spatial policy dependence? To our knowledge, Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) 
were the first to argue for spatial policy dependence being conditional on domestic political 
factors and to explicitly test for such conditionality in international tax competition. They 
find that a country’s responsiveness to changes in competitors’ tax rates is systematically 
higher where the ideological distance among domestic veto players decreases and where the 
domestic government moves further right along the political spectrum. Only a handful or so 
of other studies specify spatial policy dependence as conditional on responsiveness – see 
Swank (2006) and Wasserfallen (2011) on tax policies, Shipan and Volden (2008) on anti-
smoking policies, Martin (2009a, 2009b) on tobacco taxation and smoke free air legislation, 
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Cao and Prakash (2009) on environmental pollution, Perkins and Neumayer (2010, 2011a) on 
corporate voluntary standards and carbon dioxide efficiency, and Aklin and Urpelainen 
(2010) on the establishing of environmental ministries. This represents a tiny minority of the 
800 or so articles on spatial policy dependence that Graham, Shipan and Volden (2008) have 
identified in the top fifty political science journals. If our argument is right, then many more 
future studies should explicitly test for both types of conditional spatial policy dependence. In 
the remainder of this article, we therefore discuss model specifications that allow researchers 
to appropriately test theories of conditional spatial policy dependence. 
4.  Testing Theories of Spatial Policy Dependence 
We have argued that while many policy choices depend on previous choices of the same 
policy in other jurisdictions, spatial policy dependence is unlikely to be unconditional. We 
have developed two arguments suggesting conditional spatial policy dependence. First, the 
extent of spatial exposure is likely to differ across jurisdictions. The “openness” of countries, 
states, districts, and communities varies with respect to their economic integration, the mo-
bility of their people, the extent of contact with central senders, the capacity of their govern-
ments to look elsewhere for innovative policy solutions or to learn from the mistakes other 
governments made in the past. Jurisdictions that are more exposed to external stimuli are 
therefore ceteris paribus likely to respond more to policies in other jurisdictions. Yet, every-
thing is not equal. The political responsiveness to any given spatial stimulus also varies. Po-
litical regime type, electoral system, veto players and other constitutional and institutional 
factors as well as economic and social conditions are likely to shape a government’s respon-
siveness to policy choices and policy experiences of governments in other jurisdictions. For 
both reasons spatial policy stimuli are unlikely to unconditionally influence policy choices.  
17 
In this section, we develop model specifications which allow appropriate tests for theories of 
conditional spatial policy dependence. We will show that not row-standardizing the spatial 
lag variable is in fact a special case of a more general interaction model, in which the row-
standardized spatial lag variable is interacted with the row sum of weights used in the crea-
tion of the spatial lag. We thus show it is possible to estimate spatial econometric models in a 
way that allows the convenience of spatial lags created with row-standardized weighting ma-
trices without imposing the implausible assumption of uniform exposure to the spatial stim-
ulus by interacting the row-standardized spatial lag variable with a measure of absolute or 
relative exposure. Similarly, heterogeneity in responsiveness can also be accounted for via an 
interaction effect. 
All empirical tests of theories of spatial policy dependence have to address four important 
questions. We start with two questions researchers must answer even in the case of uncondi-
tional spatial dependence, before moving to conditional dependence. 
4.1.  Unconditional Spatial Policy Dependence 
The first question to ask is whether a specific policy of a jurisdiction depends on the same 
policy in other jurisdictions? A positive answer to this question is the pre-condition for the 
existence of spatial policy dependence. Simply because jurisdictions adopt the same policies 
or change their policies in the same direction does not constitute spatial dependence since 
they may either all be driven by some third factor or make joint policy decisions. Referring to 
the jurisdiction of interest as i (receiver) and all other jurisdictions as k (sender), spatial pol-
icy dependence is defined as 
( )i ky f y=            (1) 
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with i k≠ , where y denotes the policy of interest. We restrict the discussion to cases in which 
i and k come from the same population N, but it is possible that receivers are different from 
the senders of spatial stimuli. 
Secondly, do policies of the other countries exert the same influence on the policy choice of 
the country of interest or do the policies in some countries exert a stronger influence on the 
country of interest than others and if so why and how? In almost all relevant empirical appli-
cations, some senders will be more important than others, such that one needs an N x N con-
nectivity or weighting matrix, which links jurisdictions i with k and gives differential weight 
to jurisdictions k according to their importance as a sender of the spatial stimulus for i. These 
connectivity elements are strictly non-negative and take a value of zero if the observations i 
and k are unconnected. If one wishes to model positive and negative spatial dependence at the 
same time – for example, positive learning from some states’ success and negative learning 
from other states’ failure or positive externalities from some countries’ military expenditures 
and negative externalities from other countries’ expenditures – then this should not be mod-
eled by positive weights for the former and negative weights for the latter. Instead, two sepa-
rate spatial lag variables should be constructed, one with positive weights for countries from 
which positive spatial dependence emanates and another one with positive weights for coun-
tries from which negative spatial dependence is received. This more general model specifica-
tion avoids artificially restricting the strength of positive and negative spatial dependence to 
be the same. Accordingly, spatial policy dependence in which outside jurisdictions exert dif-
ferential influence on the policy choice of the jurisdiction i under observation is modeled as a 
function of both the value of the dependent variable in other units of observation and a 
weighting matrix ikw  that links jurisdictions i to k: 
( ),i ik ky f w y=    .           (2) 
19 
4.2.  Heterogeneity in Exposure to the Spatial Stimulus 
The third question to ask is whether exposure to the spatial stimulus of all jurisdictions is 
thought to be identical or variable across the population and if so how? If the strength of spa-
tial stimulus is identical across all i, we can row-standardize the connectivity weights. Mov-
ing to a scalar notation, a row-standardized spatial lag variable in monadic cross-sectional 















   ,  (3) 
where itX is a vector of explanatory (control) variables, which could include the temporally 
lagged dependent variable as well as period and unit fixed effects, and 
it
ε  is an identically 
and independently distributed (i.i.d.) error process.12 
Yet, row-standardization assumes that the strength of the spatial stimulus is equal for all i and 
we have argued in the previous section that this is not necessarily a plausible theoretical as-
sumption. In Plümper and Neumayer (2010a) we suggested that not to row-standardize spa-
tial lag variables often provides a better fit between theory and model specification.13 Not 
row-standardized models are specified as follows: 
                                                 
11
  See Neumayer and Plümper (2010a) for spatial effects in a dyadic setting. 
12
  Sometimes the spatial lag is also temporally lagged. 
13
  This is the empirical model specification adopted in Neumayer and Plümper (2010b) and 





y Xywρ β ε= + +∑    ,  (4) 
Instead of representing the weighted average of the value of the dependent variable in other 
jurisdictions, a not row-standardized spatial lag variable represents the weighted sum of the 
value of the dependent variable. However, such models are a special case of a more general 
model with a row-standardized spatial lag variable interacted with the sum of weights: 
1 2 3
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   ,  (5) 
The first term on the right-hand side of the equation represents the row-standardized spatial 
lag variable, the second term is the interaction between it and the row sum of weights, while 
the third term is the row sum of weights – for example, total absolute trade or, depending on 
theory, total trade openness, i.e. trade divided by GDP, in case of trade as the connectivity 
variable. The specification of the not row-standardized spatial lag variable of equation (4) is 
nothing else but specification (5) and simultaneously constraining the coefficients 1ρ  and 3ρ  













. Simply including a spatial lag variable 
that is not row-standardized in one’s estimation model can still be justified if one has reason 
to believe that 1ρ  and 3ρ  should be zero, i.e. if one believes that contingent on the presence 
of the not row-standardized spatial lag in the estimation model there is no independent effect 
of the row-standardized spatial lag and that there is no independent effect of the row sum of 
weights on the dependent variable. However, in general it will be better to free the 
coefficients 1ρ  and 3ρ  and to estimate model (5) rather than not to row-standardize the 
spatial lag variable. In many spatial lag applications the weighting matrix is time-invariant. If 




is perfectly co-linear with the unit effects. Yet, the estimation of 1ρ  and 2ρ  remains 
unbiased. 
Standard textbooks on interaction effects provide guidance on how to interpret and plot the 
interaction effects – see Brambor et al. (2004), Braumoeller (2004), and Franzese and Kam 
(2007). If no evidence for heterogeneity in exposure to the spatial stimulus is found,14 then 
scholars may as well estimate the more parsimonious model (3) with a row-standardized 
spatial lag variable only, i.e. without the interaction effect. Note that even then, one may wish 
to keep ikt
k
w∑  in the estimation model if there is reason to expect that the variable that 
constitutes the row-sums of the weighting matrix linking jurisdictions i and k has an 
independent effect on the dependent variable. For example, if the weights iktw  represent 
bilateral trade of country i with foreign countries k (either in absolute terms or relative to 
country i’s GDP), then one may wish to include ikt
k
w∑  in the estimation model if one 
believes that country i’s total trade openness with all other countries k has an independent 
effect on the dependent variable. 
In many settings specification (5) will be appropriate for testing for heterogeneity in exposure 
to the spatial stimulus. However, the conditioning variable used for testing for heterogeneity 
in exposure to the spatial stimulus need not be the same variable used in the weighting ma-
trix. For example, one may use distance as the weighting matrix in lieu of bilateral FDI stock 
positions, for which often data are not available, on the basis of a gravity-type model of bilat-
eral FDI stocks, but use the total FDI openness of country i, for which data is often available, 
as the conditioning variable. If so, then the specification is different from (5), namely: 
                                                 
14
  This can be tricky to establish in non-linear models – see, for example, Ai and Norton (2003) 
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where 1itz  is the conditioning variable – total FDI openness in the example above. 
Specifications (5) and (6) already point clearly in the direction that testing for heterogeneity 
in exposure to the spatial stimulus is nothing else but testing for conditional spatial policy 
dependence. However, there are two conceptually separate reasons for such conditionality – 
one arising from heterogeneity in exposure to the spatial stimulus, the other coming from het-
erogeneity in responsiveness to any given stimulus, to which we turn now. 
4.3.  Heterogeneity in Responsiveness 
Finally, the fourth and last question to be addressed is whether the responsiveness to spatial 
stimuli is thought to systematically differ among jurisdictions i and if so how? Governments 
often respond differently to identical stimuli given their institutional, political, economic or 
social setting. This is again best modeled as an interaction effect between the spatial lag vari-
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Specification (7) is essentially the same as (6), with the exception that 1itz  has been replaced 
by 2itz  to clarify that these are different conditioning variables: while 
1
itz  conditioned for 
heterogeneity in exposure to the spatial stimulus, 2itz  conditions for heterogeneity in the 
responsiveness of jurisdictions. For example, 2itz  could measure political constraints imposed 
by the existence and location of veto players or could measure the partisan location of the 
government. 
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If there is both heterogeneity in exposure to the spatial stimulus and heterogeneity in the re-
sponsiveness to any given stimulus, then researchers need to employ two interaction effects. 
There are two options then. Either one specifies, following Braumoeller (2004), a full double 
interaction effects model, in which all possible interactions between the constituent terms of 
both interaction effects are also included in the model, unless theory strongly suggests that 
certain constituent components can safely be assumed to be equal to zero (Franzese and Kam 
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,   (9) 
depending on whether heterogeneity in exposure to the spatial stimulus is modeled according 
to (5) or (6). Alternatively, one can follow Franzese (1999, 2003) and Plümper and Neumayer 
(2010b) and first estimate the joint effect of the row-standardized spatial lag variable and the 
conditioning variable that accounts for heterogeneity in exposure to the spatial stimulus (i.e. 
either the row sum of weights or another variable), compute the vector of this joint effect and 
then interact this vector with the institutional, political, economic or social conditioning vari-
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able that accounts for heterogeneity in responsiveness. Formally, define itV
∧
 as the vector of 
the following joint effect: 
1 2 3
ikt ikt
it ikt iktkt kt
k k k kikt ikt
k k




   
   
= + ⋅ +
   
      
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
,   (10) 




it it itkt kt
k kikt ikt
k k
w wV z zy y
w w
ρ ρ φ∧
   
   
= + ⋅ +
   
      
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
,    (11) 
then the full model is specified as follows:15 
2 2
1 2it itit it it it ity V V z z Xϕ ϕ φ β ε
∧ ∧
= + ⋅ + + +       (12) 
Specification (12) is justified if one believes that it is the entire spatial effect, including the 
part which accounts for heterogeneity in exposure to the spatial stimulus, that is conditioned 
by some institutional, political, economic or social variable accounting for heterogeneity in 
responsiveness. If one is unwilling to make this assumption, then one needs to estimate either 
model (8) or (9). 
 Table 1 provides an overview of our model specification advice for cases in which 
scholars wish to model heterogeneity in exposure only, heterogeneity in responsiveness only, 
or both types of heterogeneity together. 
                                                 
15
  Upon publication, we provide Stata example code that allows scholars to easily apply this 
specification choice. 
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5.  An Application Example: Diffusion of Double Taxation Treaties 
In order to show how failing to take into account heterogeneity in exposure and 
responsiveness can lead to wrong inferences with respect to spatial policy dependence, we 
look at the diffusion of double taxation treaties (DTTs) as an application example. DTTs are 
costly to capital-importing countries because such treaties typically favor residence over 
source taxation and they are costly even to capital exporters as they create a loss of national 
sovereignty. Concluding DTTs also creates benefits, however, in terms of additional FDI 
between the country pair or at least preventing FDI diversion toward other dyads with DTTs 
in place. 
Barthel and Neumayer (2012) study in detail how country pair dyads spatially depend in their 
decision on whether to conclude a DTT between themselves on the prior DTT behavior of 
other dyads. Specifically, they argue that, among other factors, countries will look toward 
whether other countries with whom they compete in export markets have previously 
concluded DTTs. They analyze DTT diffusion over the period 1969 to 2005 in a Cox 
proportional hazard model. Since DTTs represent a so-called undirected variable (it is 
typically impossible to determine who initiated the DTT), they model what Neumayer and 
Plümper (2010) have termed undirected dyad contagion. They find that a spatial lag variable, 
in which the sum of measures of export market similarity between country i and country k on 
the one hand and country j and country m on the other hand represents the weighting variable 
between the dyad ij under observation and other dyads km, does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the time it takes for the dyad ij to conclude a DTT. This result is 
replicated in model 1 of table 1 and it seemingly suggests the absence of spatial policy 
dependence in DTT conclusions via export market similarity as the diffusion mechanism. 
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Model 2 of table 2 demonstrates that this would in fact be a wrong inference to make. Model 
1 fails to take into account that dyads will strongly differ in their exposure to a spatial 
stimulus from other dyads inducing them to conclude a DTT. Model 2 takes one possible 
determinant of such heterogeneity in exposure into account: the maximum number of DTTs 
(DTT_max) that either of the two countries i or j has previously concluded. The reason is that 
if one of the dyad members has already a large DTT network in place, they will have covered 
already the most attractive countries with whom to conclude a DTT, rendering this country 
much less likely to conclude yet another DTT and the dyad is thus far less exposed to the 
spatial stimulus from other dyads. This is exactly what the results for model 2 suggest. There 
is a positive spatial stimulus on the dyad ij to conclude a DTT if other export market 
competing countries have previously concluded DTTs. However, this spatial stimulus 
decreases as DTT_max increases and it becomes zero if one of the dyad members has already 
approximately 90 DTTs in place. 
In addition to heterogeneity in exposure, heterogeneity in political responsiveness is also 
likely to condition spatial policy dependence in DTT diffusion. Recall that DTTs generate 
national sovereignty losses. It is therefore plausible that governments, which are led by 
nationalist parties, for whom the preservation of national sovereignty is a major policy 
objective, are less likely to respond to the spatial policy stimulus coming from competing 
dyads. To test this hypothesis, we follow the modeling strategy of equation (10) above and 
compute the joint effect of the spatial lag variable, the DTT_max variable and their 
interaction. In model 3, we include this vector as an explanatory variable in lieu of its 
constituent variables. By definition, this vector must have a coefficient of exactly one. More 
importantly, in model 4 we then interact this vector with a dummy variable that is set to one 
if at least one of the country pair’s governments’ chief executive is from a nationalist party, 
using information from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). Consistent 
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with our expectation, nationalist governments are less likely to respond to the spatial policy 
stimulus from other countries, where heterogeneity in exposure of dyads to the spatial policy 
stimulus is already taken into account. In sum, this application example demonstrates how 
failure to take into account heterogeneity in exposure and responsiveness can lead to wrong 
inferences with respect to spatial policy dependence. 
6.  Conclusion 
Spatial policy dependence is easily confused with the clustering of policies or the temporal 
coincidence of changes in policy choices. Striving for greater clarity in theoretical accounts 
of spatial policy dependence with particular attention paid to the causal mechanisms under-
lying such dependence will help convincing others that policies in one jurisdiction truly caus-
ally depend on policies in other jurisdictions. Comprehensively specified theories are also 
likely to postulate heterogeneity in the exposure of jurisdictions to the spatial stimulus re-
ceived from other jurisdictions as well as heterogeneity in the responsiveness to any given 
stimulus. We have provided general theoretical arguments, which suggest spatial policy de-
pendence is often conditioned by differences in exposure as a consequence of differences in 
the intensity of interactions among jurisdictions with the outside world. Similarly, we have 
demonstrated how theory typically predicts differences in responsiveness to any stimulus as a 
consequence of the institutional, political, economic or social context in which jurisdictions 
operate. Current standard empirical model specification practice does not match such com-
prehensive theories of spatial policy dependence: by estimating one single common coeffi-
cient for a row-standardized spatial lag they implicitly assume uniformity in both exposure 
and responsiveness.  
Appropriate tests of theoretical predictions require a good ‘fit’ between theory and model 
specification. We have therefore advised on how models can be specified to take into account 
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both types of conditional spatial policy dependence. Heterogeneity in exposure could in prin-
ciple be accounted for by not row-standardizing the spatial lag variable, as suggested in 
Plümper and Neumayer (2010a). However, such a model specification is a special case of a 
more general model, in which the spatial lag is row-standardized, as typically recommended 
by methodologists, but is also interacted with another variable that accounts for the extent of 
exposure. Such a variable will typically be the row-sums of the connectivity matrix (e.g. the 
row-sums of bilateral trade dependencies summing to total trade dependence for each unit of 
observation) employed in the creation of the row-standardized spatial lag variable; but it 
could also be another variable capturing levels of exposure. Heterogeneity in responsiveness 
is also best modeled as an interaction effect between the spatial lag variable and a variable 
capturing the factor that drives differences in responsiveness to any given spatial stimulus. 
Both types of conditionality are thus best modeled as interaction effects, even if the underly-
ing reason for conditionality is different. 
Model specification becomes more complex if both types of conditionality simultaneously 
exist. This requires either a model with double interaction effects, which must therefore also 
include all possible interactions among all constituent terms of both individual interactions, 
or a model that interacts the variable capturing differences in responsiveness with a vector 
consisting of the joint effect of the interaction of the row-standardized spatial lag variable 
with the conditioning variable that accounts for heterogeneity in exposure. The latter ap-
proach is justified if one is willing to assume that it is the entire spatial effect (incorporating 
heterogeneity in exposure) that is conditioned by institutional, political, economic or social 
variables. This assumption is not very restrictive, hence we believe applied researchers will 
wish to resort to this model specification, the results of which are more easily interpreted than 
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Table 1. Overview of modeling specification advice. 
Heterogeneity in exposure only (row sum of weights as exposure variable): 
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Table 2: Conditional Spatial Policy Dependence in DTT Diffusion. 
Model 1 2 3 4 
Row-standardized spatial lag (SL) 6.212 20.48***   
 (5.560) (5.837)   
Row-standardized SL*DTT_max 
 -0.227***   
 
 (0.0285)   
Max. number of DTTs (t-1) -0.0381*** -0.0125**   
 (0.00384) (0.00513)   
Vector from grey-shaded variables 
  1.000*** 1.043*** 
 
  (0.0748) (0.0767) 
Vector * Nationalist dummy 
   -0.164** 
 
   (0.0791) 
Nationalist dummy 
   -0.104 
 
   (0.0895) 
Product of populations (ln) 0.126*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.112*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0268) (0.0260) (0.0271) 
Product of GDPs per capita (ln) 0.0696*** 0.0709*** 0.0709*** 0.0667** 
 (0.0268) (0.0269) (0.0265) (0.0279) 
Bilateral trade (ln, t-1) 0.128*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.118*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0168) 
Product of openness to trade 6.66e-05*** 6.29e-05*** 6.29e-05*** 6.28e-05*** 
 (6.22e-06) (6.03e-06) (6.05e-06) (6.25e-06) 
Bilateral Investment Treaty dummy 1.437*** 1.408*** 1.408*** 1.418*** 
 (0.0789) (0.0746) (0.0752) (0.0770) 
Regional Trade Agreement dummy -0.103 -0.157 -0.157 -0.0896 
 (0.0984) (0.0995) (0.0995) (0.0974) 
Offshore Financial Centre dummy -0.413*** -0.322*** -0.322*** -0.409*** 
 (0.113) (0.106) (0.110) (0.117) 
Diplomatic representation 0.998*** 1.041*** 1.041*** 1.096*** 
 (0.0941) (0.0951) (0.0950) (0.0998) 
Distance (ln) -0.358*** -0.349*** -0.349*** -0.343*** 
 (0.0455) (0.0461) (0.0454) (0.0480) 
Product of political constraints 0.612*** 0.581*** 0.581*** 0.513*** 
 (0.151) (0.145) (0.144) (0.148) 
Min. years of independence -0.00656*** -0.00604*** -0.00604*** -0.00587*** 
 
(0.00187) (0.00184) (0.00182) (0.00189) 
Cum. number of DTTs country 1 (t-1) 0.0461*** 0.0462*** 0.0462*** 0.0476*** 
 
(0.00397) (0.00369) (0.00306) (0.00292) 
Cum. number of DTTs country 2 (t-1) 0.0439*** 0.0438*** 0.0438*** 0.0462*** 
  
(0.00384) (0.00359) (0.00294) (0.00282) 
Observations 249,357 249,357 249,357 213,907 
 
Notes: Cox proportional hazard estimator. Standard errors clustered on country dyads in 
parentheses; OECD grouping dummy variables included (not shown); Breslow 
approximation for tied events; * statistically significant at .1, ** .05, or *** .01 level. 
